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RICO BASICS: A PRIMER
STEPHEN D. BROWN
ALAN M. LIEBERMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
V IRTUALLY every federal litigator has run into the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)' since it
became a popular tool in civil litigation about ten years ago.
Whether you are pro-RICO 2 or anti-RICO,3 the statute is a fact of
life in today's complex, federal litigation. It has been used in
wrongful discharge cases, 4 against pro-life activists, 5 in securities
cases 6 and virtually every other area of litigation. 7 Therefore, to-
day's federal litigator must be familiar with RICO.
RICO is a criminal statute with a private right of action. Even
when RICO is used for civil redress, a plaintiff must prove a
crime.
The original purpose of RICO was to afford federal law en-
forcement a broad and far-reaching tool to root out organized
crime from legitimate business and to prevent the infiltration of
legitimate business by organized crime. 8
* Stephen D. Brown (B.A., 1971, Williams College; J.D., 1976, Villanova
University School of Law) and Alan M. Lieberman (A.B., 1968, Franklin & Mar-
shall College;J.D., 1971, Villanova University School of Law) are partners in the
Litigation Department of Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, who specialize in
federal white collar criminal defense, civil RICO and complex litigation. The
authors express their appreciation to Theresa Loscalzo and Dorothy Attwood
for their invaluable assistance in preparing this article.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 55, 103.
3. Rehnquist, Get RICO Cases Out of My Courtroom, Wall St. J., May 19, 1989,
at A14, col. 4.
4. See, e.g., Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.
1989).
5. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Weinberger, 687 F. Supp. 152 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Gil-
bert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
7. See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d
1052 (3d Cir. 1988) (commercial bribery), affd, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990); Saporito
v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 843 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1988) (ERISA), vacated and
remanded for reconsideration, 109 S. Ct. 1306 (1989); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Ref.
Co., 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984) (breach of contract).
8. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) ("[Tlhe major pur-
(865)
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The development of RICO as a private civil cause of action
has taken the statute far beyond its original purposes. The basic
elements of the statute define organized crime. Yet this definition
is not limited to the traditional concept of the gangster or the
mob involved in narcotics, prostitution, illegal gambling, extor-
tion, contract murder, contract arson and similar conduct associ-
ated with traditional organized criminal elements in the United
States. RICO defendants can be a Fortune 100 company and its
CEO just as easily as Nicky Scarfo and La Cosa Nostra.
This article will attempt to introduce the reader to the basic
concepts and issues necessary to develop a working knowledge of
RICO. The article is divided into three parts. The first section
outlines the definitions and elements of the statute. The second
section delves into issues which frequently arise in RICO litiga-
tion, such as what constitutes a pattern, statutes of limitations and
the enterprise requirement. The third section will discuss the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of including a RICO claim in your
complaint.
The article is not intended to make you a RICO expert. The
article will provide the reader with a fundamental understanding
of the statute and its applications so that he or she is able to make
informed decisions in bringing and defending RICO claims.
II. RICO Is A STATUTE
RICO is not a common law creature-it is a statute.9 If you
have a working knowledge of the statute, you will have a working
knowledge of RICO.
A. The Private Cause of Action
Subsection (c) of section 1964 provides a civil cause of action
for a substantive violation of RICO. Section 1964(c) reads:
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may
sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sus-
tains and the cost of the suit including a reasonable at-
torney's fee. 10
pose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized
crime."); see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-28 (1983).
9. Russello, 464 U.S. at 20; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
866 [Vol. 35: p. 865
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There are two key provisions in section 1964(c): who or what
is a person and what type of injury gives rise to a cause of action.
First, the term "person" is defined in section 1961(3) to mean
"any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial
interest in property."" I Therefore, a RICO plaintiff can be a part-
nership, corporation, individual or other organization.' 2 Second,
RICO only provides relief for persons injured in their "business
or property." RICO does not provide relief for personal
injuries.'3
Another issue which frequently arises under section 1964(c)
is causation. Only that person injured by the violation of section
1962 can sue. Therefore, if a business is damaged by section
1962, the stockholders or the creditors of the business which lose
money as a result of the damage done to the business cannot sue
under RICO. 14 The business is the only "person" injured "by
reason of" the violation. Therefore, the stockholders or creditors
do not have standing to sue under section 1964(c).
B. The Key Definitions-Section 1961
Section 1962 outlines four specific substantive violations of
RICO. 15 There are four key definitions contained in the RICO
definitional section which are common to all four substantive vio-
lations. A firm grasp of these definitional sections is essential to
working with the statute. The application of each of the four
causes of action under RICO turns on the relationship between
these four key definitions.
The four key terms are:
1. "Racketeering activity" (sometimes referred to as "predi-
cate acts"); 16
2. "Person" (most significant as the defining term for the
11. Id. § 1961(3).
12. See, e.g., Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.
1989) (individual); Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989) (individual,
partnership and corporation); Fiorentino v. Converse, 705 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.
Pa.), afd, 884 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1989) (individual); Environmental Tectonics v.
W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988) (corporation).
13. Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169 (3d Cir.
1987).
14. Carol Cable Co. v. Koffler, No. 89-1657 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); John L. Motley Assoc. v. Rumbaugh, No. 86-
73 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Blue Line Coal Co.
v. Equibank, No. 87-6150 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
16. Id. § 1961(1).
1990] 867
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defendant); 17
3. "Enterprise";' 8 and
4. "Pattern of racketeering activity".19 Each of these will be
discussed briefly below.
First, "racketeering activity" includes a series of specific fed-
eral and state statutes which Congress decided were most charac-
teristic of organized crime. Not all criminal activity, however,
falls within RICO as a predicate offense. Only the criminal stat-
utes specifically designated in the definition of racketeering activ-
ity may serve as a predicate act constituting a "pattern." The
most commonly asserted predicate offenses because of their
breadth are mail fraud 20 and wire fraud.21 Mail [or wire] fraud is
simply the execution or attempted execution of a scheme or arti-
fice to defraud in which the United States mail is utilized to trans-
mit matter integral to the scheme.22
Second, the definition of "person" is the same definition as
discussed above.23 Third, "enterprise" is defined in section
1961(4)24 and is key because it is the enterprise concept which, in
part, makes RICO unique. Under RICO law, enterprises may be
lawful, unlawful or passive; they may be culpable or non-culpa-
ble.25 "Enterprise" is defined as "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal en-
tity. '"26 "Enterprise" encompasses both wholly illegitimate (such
as the Mafia or LaCosa Nostra) as well as legitimate enterprises. 27
The fourth key definition is "pattern of racketeering activ-
17. Id. § 1961(3).
18. Id. § 1961(4).
19. Id. § 1961(5).
20. Id. § 1341.
21. Id. § 1343. In Tafflin v. Levitt, the United States Supreme Court noted
that "54.9% of all RICO cases after Sedima involved 'common law fraud' and
another 18.0% involved either 'nonsecurities fraud' or 'theft or conversion.' "
110 S. Ct. 792, 799 (1990) (citing 2 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 7 (Apr.
14, 1987)).
22. Schmuck v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1443, 1447 (1989). The elements
of the wire fraud statute are identical to those in the mail fraud statute except
that the defendant must cause the use of interstate wire communications rather
than the mails. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1334 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895,
903 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976).
23. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
25. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
27. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981).
868 [Vol. 35: p. 865
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ity." It is the "pattern" along with the enterprise requirement
which distinguishes RICO from single episode criminal conduct
or "garden variety" fraud. The use of pattern was intended to
make sure that RICO does not cover isolated criminal conduct,
but rather criminal conduct which has some relationship and a
threat of continuity.28 Section 1961(5) defines pattern of racke-
teering activity as:
[A]t least two acts of racketeering activity [as defined in
section 1961(1)], one of which occurred after the effec-
tive date of this chapter and the last of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment)
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity. 29
The concept of pattern of racketeering activity will be touched on
more below.
C. The Elements of a Cause of Action
Once one understands the definitions covered above, the
next step is to understand what RICO was designed to prohibit.
RICO was designed to prevent organized crime from:
1. Investing in or acquiring legitimate businesses with crim-
inal money;
2. Maintaining or acquiring businesses through criminal ac-
tivity; or
3. Operating businesses through criminal activity. 30 Each
of these three goals is fulfilled by a specific subsection of section
1962.
Section 1962(a) fulfills the first goal. 3 1 Section 1962(a) pro-
hibits a person from investing criminally obtained money ac-
quired through a pattern of racketeering activity into a legitimate
business. The specific elements of section 1962(a) are:
1. A defendant person;
2. Received income derived from;
3. A pattern of racketeering activity;
4. Investing the racketeering income or its proceeds;
28. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989); see Mar-
shall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
30. Id. § 1962.
31. Id. § 1962(a).
1990] 869
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5. In the acquisition of an interest in or the establishment or opera-
tion of,
6. Any enterprise;
7. Engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.32
Standing is a significant issue under section 1962(a). Section
1962(a) prohibits investment of racketeering income or its pro-
ceeds-it does not prohibit engaging in mail fraud or predicate
acts themselves. Therefore, a victim of the predicate acts under
section 1962(a) does not have standing under RICO because that
person has not been hurt by a violation of section 1962(a) but
merely by the pattern of racketeering activity.33
The essential elements of section 1962(b) are:
1. A defendant person;
2. Acquiring or maintaining any interest in or control of;
3. An enterprise (engaged in, or the activities of which af-
fect, interstate or foreign commerce);
4. Through a pattern of racketeering activity.3 4 Thus, sub-
section (b) differs from subsection (a) in that subsection (b) re-
quires the purpose of the pattern to be to acquire or maintain an
interest in an enterprise, whereas (a) uses the pattern of racke-
teering activity to generate income, which is subsequently invested
in an enterprise.
The essential elements of section 1962(c) are:
1. A defendant person;
2. Employed by or associated with;
3. An enterprise (engaged in, or the activities of which af-
fect, interstate or foreign commerce);
4. Who conducts or participates in the conduct of the affairs
of the enterprise;
5. Through a pattern of racketeering activity.35 It is impor-
tant to note that section 1962(c) adds a new element-that is, the
defendant person must be employed by or associated with the
enterprise.
Once again, under subsection (c), it is important to read the
32. Id.
33. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Carol Cable
Co. v. Koffler, No. 89-1657 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file);John L. Motley Assoc. v. Rumbaugh, No. 86-73 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
35. Id. § 1962(c).
870 [Vol. 35: p. 865
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statute carefully because it defines who can be a proper defend-
ant. Because of the addition of the requirement that the person
be associated with or employed by the enterprise, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the
"'person' charged with [violating section 1962(c)] cannot be the
same entity as the 'enterprise'.- 3 6 Therefore, a plaintiff must be
careful in distinguishing between the person and the enterprise
when pleading a claim under section 1962(c). 37
Some plaintiffs have argued successfully that where the en-
terprise consists of a group of entities, of which the defendant is
only a part, it is not the same entity as the defendant corporation
standing alone.38 Thus, the "person" and "enterprise" are dis-
tinct entities.
The final subsection under section 1962 makes it a crime to
conspire to violate any of the previous three subsections.
The essential elements of section 1962(d) are:
1. A defendant person;
2. Who agreed to violate any of the substantive provisions
of section 1962(a), (b) or (c). 3 9
Interestingly enough, the Third Circuit has held that claims
potentially barred by the standing requirements of subsections
(a), (b) or (c) may be permitted under (d). In Shearin v. E.F. Hut-
ton Group, Inc.,40 Chief Judge Gibbons held that although the
plaintiff-employee lacked standing to pursue a substantive civil
RICO remedy, she did have standing to bring an action for con-
36. B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1984).
37. It is unclear whether the Third Circuit undercut B.F. Hirsch in Rose v.
Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989). The Third Circuit in Rose distinguished its
B. F. Hirsch decision on the basis that its holding in B.F. Hirsch (requiring de-
fendant person and enterprise to be separate) governed instances where the en-
terprise was innocent of wrongdoing, passive or victimized by the RICO
persons. Rose, 871 F.2d at 358-59. For purposes of determining whether an
enterprise can also be a defendant person under § 1962(c), the issue is whether
the enterprise participated in racketeering activity or benefited from it
consciously.
38. Compare Morgan v. Staats, No. 84-2765 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Moravian Dev. Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 651
F. Supp. 144, 147 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (corporate entity named as "person" separate
and distinct from association-in-fact consisting of group of corporations includ-
ing "person"); Temple Univ. v. Salla Bros., 656 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1986) and
Wright v. Everett Cash Mut. Ins. Co., 637 F. Supp. 155, 156-57 (W.D. Pa. 1986)
(insurer and insurance agent not same entity; insurer and claims agent separate
entities) with Sheridan v. Weinberger, 687 F. Supp. 152, 157-58 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(defendant "person" may not even be part of enterprise).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988).
40. 885 F.2d 1162, 1169-70 (3d Cir. 1989).
1990]
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spiracy in violation of subsection (d).41 In that case, the plaintiff
alleged that her employer had terminated her to prevent her from
disclosing alleged illegal activities by her employer.42 Indeed, in
Shearin the Third Circuit held that under section 1962(d), the
plaintiff need not show injury flowing from the substantive viola-
tion.43 Rather, the plaintiff need only show injury arising from an
act predicate to the conspiracy itself, even if that act is distinct
from the racketeering acts listed in section 1961(1).44 -[E]ither
racketeering activity or classic overt conspiracy acts may qualify as
'predicate acts' to a RICO violation that causes injury." 45
Some courts have held that a corporation cannot conspire
with its agents, employees or officers unless corporate outsiders
are also involved in the agreement. 46
III. TYPICAL ISSUES
A. Jurisdiction
State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
RICO claims.47
B. Statute of Limitations
The Clayton Act's four-year statute of limitations for civil en-
forcement actions applies to RICO cases. 48 There are two other
key issues with respect to the statute of limitations on RICO
claims. The first is when the statute of limitations starts to run
and, second, whether a plaintiff is barred from recovering for in-
juries occurring outside of the four-year limitation. The Third
Circuit has answered each of these questions as follows:
[T]he limitations period for a civil RICO claim runs from
the date the plaintiff knew or should have known that the
elements of the civil RICO cause of action existed un-
less, as a part of the same pattern of racketeering activ-
ity, there is further injury to the plaintiff or further
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1164.
43. Id. at 1168-70.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1169 (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1512
& n.15 (D.NJ. 1985).
47. Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 794-95 (1990).
48. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 156
(1987).
872 [Vol. 35: p. 865
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predicate acts occur, in which case the accrual period
shall run from the time when the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the last injury or the last predicate act
which is part of the same pattern of racketeering activity.
The last predicate act need not have resulted in injury to
the plaintiff but must be part of the same pattern. If the
complaint was filed within four years of the last injury or
the last predicate act, the plaintiff may recover for inju-
ries caused by other predicate acts which occurred
outside an earlier limitations period but which are part
of the same "pattern". 49
C. Pleading Requirements
If the complaint alleges RICO claims arising out of fraud, the
scheme must be pled with particularity according to Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 50 The Third Circuit has
construed this requirement very liberally. 51
Rule 9(b) does not require allegations of date, time or place,
but the plaintiffs must use some "means of injecting precision and
some measure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud." 52
The complaint is sufficient if it describes the nature and subject of
the alleged misrepresentations. 53
49. Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1125-31 (3d Cir. 1988);
see also T.R. Whitelyn Holstein Breeder Assoc. v. Whitelyn Farms, Inc., No. 86-
6738 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
51. See generally Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989).
52. Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786,
791 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
53. See id. (list attached to complaint identifying with specificity each piece
of machinery that was subject of alleged fraud, and identifying which pieces of
machinery were the subject of which alleged fraudulent transactions is suffi-
cient); A Pocono Country Place, Inc. v. Peterson, 675 F. Supp. 968, 973 (M.D.
Pa. 1987) (list of allegedly fraudulent documents, date they were executed and
properties to which they applied is sufficient); Temple Univ. v. Salla Bros., 656
F. Supp. 97, 104 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (allegation that "from 1971 until 1984 the de-
fendants unlawfully used the mail to send 'false and fraudulent bids, invoices
and bills' to the plaintifF' is sufficient); LSC Assoc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin.
Corp., 629 F. Supp. 979, 983 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (description of scheme to defraud
and statements or omissions made to effect that scheme is sufficient).
In the following cases, the allegations were found insufficient to comport
with the Seville standard: Saporito v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 675
(3d Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded for reconsideration on other grounds, 109 S. Ct.
1306 (1989) (complaint alleging general content of misrepresentations, but fail-
ing to indicate who speakers were ["defendants and/or persons acting under
their direction and control"] or who received information ["certain ... employ-
ees other than plaintiffs"] is insufficient); Philadelphia TMC, Inc. v. AT&T Infor-
9
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D. Standard of Proof
Although the RICO statute is criminal in nature, the plaintiff
must only prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence,
rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. 54
E. Pattern
We will not discuss the pattern requirement at length here
except to discuss briefly the latest Third Circuit cases decided af-
ter the most recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
addressing the pattern requirement, H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co. 55 In H.J. Inc., the United States Supreme Court re-
cently held that the hallmarks of a "pattern" for purposes of sec-
tion 1961(5) are continuity and relationship. 56 A single scheme
may satisfy the pattern requirement if it encompasses multiple
predicate acts that relate to and amount to, or threaten the likeli-
hood of, continued criminal activity. 57
The relatedness requirement is satisfied if the criminal acts
have " 'the same or similar purposes, results, participants, vic-
tims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by
mation Sys., 651 F. Supp. 169, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (complaint alleging subject
of alleged fraud and general nature of misrepresentations but failing to allege
nature of fraudulent statements and context in which they were made is insuffi-
cient); Moravian Dev. Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 651 F. Supp. 144, 148-49 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (complaint alleging defendants manufactured, marketed, sold prod-
uct, that they misrepresented same, and that "on numerous occasions" defend-
ant caused letters to be mailed and information to be transmitted by wire
containing false information is insufficient); McLendon v. Continental Group,
Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1509 (D.NJ. 1985) (pleadings must allege all five ele-
ments of common law fraud-plaintiff must detail with specificity false misrepre-
sentations upon which mail fraud claim is based); see also Odesser v. Vogel, No.
85-6931 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 1986) (1986 WL 4463) (allowing plaintiffs leave to
amend fourth version of complaint to try to reallege activities "that plausibly
could have involved the use of mails or wires" but that failed to provide ad-
dresses or even names of recipients).
54. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985) ("[N]o indi-
cation that Congress sought to depart from [preponderance standard in private
civil actions]."); see, e.g., United States v. Local 560 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); Kimmel v. Peter-
son, 565 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1983). But the elements of the offense of claim
are the same whether the case is civil or criminal. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F.
Supp. 1347, 1342 (E.D. Pa. 1983), vacated in part, rev'd in part, afd in part, 766
F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); see also Gilbert v. Prudential-
Bache Sec., Inc., 769 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1985); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp.
131 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
55. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
56. Id. at 2900.
57. Id. at 2899.
874
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distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.' "58
Continuity is a temporal concept which can be either closed-
ended or open-ended, referring either to a closed period of re-
peated conduct, or to past conduct that by its very nature contem-
plates a threat of repetition in the future.59
Before H.J. Inc., the Third Circuit had developed a multiple
factor test to determine whether a pattern existed. In Barticheck v.
Fidelity Union Bank/First National State,6° the Third Circuit held
that in assessing whether a pattern exists, a district court should
consider the following factors: "the number of unlawful acts, the
length of time over which the acts were committed, the similarity
of the acts, the number of victims, the number of perpetrators,
and the character of the unlawful activity."''r A substantial body
of law was developed applying the Barticheck factor test.
In its first RICO decision after H.J. Inc., the Third Circuit
held that a scheme extending from February 1987 to April 8,
1988 to remove assets from a company and, therefore, render it
insolvent did not satisfy the "continuity component of the pattern
requirement. ' 62 The court stated:
58. Id. at 2901 (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 2902.
60. 832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987).
61. Id. at 38, 39 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Zauber, 857
F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1340 (1989); Environmental Tec-
tonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), a f'd, 110 S. Ct.
701 (1990); Saporito v. Combustian Eng'g Inc., 843 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1988),
vacated and rermandedfor reconsideration, 109 S. Ct. 1306 (1989); Paradise Hotel
Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1988); Marshall-Silver Con-
str. Co. v. Mendel, 835 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded for reconsidera-
tion, 109 S. Ct. 3233 (1990). District courts applying the "multiple factor" test
announced in Barticheck focused in particular on the number of victims, number
of perpetrators and extent of injury factors, and dismissed RICO complaints that
alleged single victim, close-ended, "one-shot" fraudulent schemes. See, e.g.,
Central Beef Co. v. Compas, No. 89-2627 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1989) (1989 WL
71591) (dismissed RICO action for failure to allege pattern as case involved only
a single victim, a single injury, and a single short-lived scheme); Szegda v.
Swedeland Road Corp., No. 89-1767 (E.D. Pa.June 13, 1989) (1989 WL 64302)
(granted motion to dismiss RICO complaint on basis that single, limited scheme
involving two perpetrators, single injury and single victim did not constitute pat-
tern of racketeering activity); Forum Publications, Inc. v. P.T. Publishers, Inc.,
700 F. Supp. 236 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (held complaint did not allege pattern suffi-
cient to support RICO claim as case involved relatively simple scheme, few per-
petrators and only one victim); Goldstein v. Schenk, No. 86-7396 (E.D. Pa. May
16, 1988) (1988 WL 48545) (dismissed RICO complaint as only one victim and
one injury alleged), affid, 865 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1988).
62. Fiorentino v. Converse, No. 89-1169, slip op. at 5 (3d Cir. Aug. 14,
1989).
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At the very least,... plaintiffs must establish a threat of
long-term criminal conduct.
We conclude that the complaint in this case alleges only
isolated, short-term conduct on the part of the defend-
ants. The sole purpose of the alleged predicate acts was
to evade a single debt owed to Fiorentino and that nar-
row purpose limited the scope of the alleged criminal ac-
tivity. As soon as that purpose was accomplished, the
activity could be expected to, and did, cease. The objective
was allegedly accomplished in a period of only about a year and
the nature of the conduct was such that there was no threat of
continuing criminal activity when the period was over. The de-
fendants' alleged activity, while illegal, simply did not
pose the kind of societal threat that was the target of
RICO. 63
Therefore, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the plaintiff's complaint.
The Third Circuit's recent decision in Swistock v. Jones,64 how-
ever, renders reliance on the Barticheck multiple factor analysis
questionable. In Swistock, the plaintiff alleged fraudulent misrep-
resentations with respect to the signing of a mineral lease. 65 Spe-
cifically, the complaint alleged six acts of mail fraud and eight acts
of wire fraud by defendants over a period of approximately four-
teen months "for the purposes of inducing plaintiffs to enter into
the leasing transaction and to induce plaintiffs to continue making
monthly payments under the lease." 66 The district court dis-
missed the case, relying upon Barticheck because "the objective of
the ... predicate acts ... was limited to the infliction of a single
harm on a limited number of victims, and . . . plaintiffs would
therefore be unable to prove the existence of a pattern. '67
While acknowledging that "the degree of concrete guidance
provided by H.J. Inc. is open to debate," 68 the court reversed.
The court concluded that "[a]lthough we also may have con-
cluded in the pre-H.J. Inc. period that plaintiffs pled at most a
state law fraud case, we are now bound to give the allegations a
63. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
64. 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989).
65. Id. at 756.
66. Id. at 759.
67. Id. at 757-58.
68. Id. at 757.
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broader interpretation. ' 6 9 The Third Circuit reasoned that, be-
cause the Supreme Court could have, but did not, address as rele-
vant the number of victims and number of perpetrators involved
in the alleged scheme, these factors could no longer be consid-
ered dispositive of the pattern inquiry. Accordingly, the court ex-
plicitly held that "[a]lthough this [district court's] result may have
been consistent with the law of this circuit as it stood at the time
the district court decided the matter, it is no longer tenable in
light of H.J. Inc. '170
The court further noted that, as a result of H.J. Inc., two cir-
cuit court decisions, including Marshall-Silver Construction Co.,
which had applied the single injury, single victim rationale to dis-
miss RICO claims, and on which the district court in Swistock re-
lied, had been remanded and vacated by the Supreme Court for
further consideration. The court declared that "[a]lthough the
vacation of these decisions does not of its own force mandate a
reversal in this case, the underpinnings of the district court's deci-
sion have been shaken."' 71 Finally, in applying the "teachings" of
H.J. Inc. to the facts of the case, the Swistock court found the com-
plaint's allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 72
It reasoned:
Treating all the allegations in the pleadings as true, as
we must at this juncture, plaintiffs may be able to estab-
lish either the existence of a closed-end period of re-
peated conduct of sufficient length or a threat of
continuity "by showing that the predicate acts . . . are
part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing busi-
ness," .... to satisfy the requirements of H.J. Inc. 73
To be sure, the court in Swistock rejected the argument that a
motion to dismiss could never be granted in this context, con-
cluding that "H.J. Inc. does not foreclose the possibility that, in a
given case, it may be proper to dismiss a RICO complaint on Rule
12(b) (6) grounds for failing to allege a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity as a matter of law. . . . "74 Nevertheless, the court conceded
that "it does appear... that in many cases plaintiffs will be able to
withstand a facial attack on the complaint and have the opportu-
69. Id. at 758.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 759.
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 758.
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nity to have their pattern allegations threshed out in discovery."' 75
Finally, the court left open the possibility that some form of
single victim, single injury analysis may ultimately survive HJ. Inc.
by declaring that "[w]hatever vitality the single victim, single in-
jury approach may have after H.J. Inc. awaits further case develop-
ment."' 76  Interestingly enough, the Third Circuit never
mentioned the Fiorentino case, decided only a month before.
Even more recently, in Marshall-Silver Construction Company,
Inc. v. Mendel,7 7 the Third Circuit had a unique opportunity to
decide whether Barticheck was still good law after H.J. Inc. Before
H. Inc., the Third Circuit affirmed a dismissal of the plaintiff's
RICO claim in Marshall-Silver.7 8 Applying the Barticheck factor
test, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff's allegations did not
pass the Barticheck test because they lacked the requisite continuity
in that the alleged criminal activity "involved [only] 'a single vic-
tim, a single injury, and a single short-lived scheme with only two
active perpetrators.' ,,79 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants
threatened to drive it out of business and subsequently seven
months later filed a bankruptcy petition knowing that it was
false.80
After the Supreme Court vacated the Third Circuit's judge-
ment in Marshall-Silver, the court decided on remand that, at least
on the facts of this case, H.J. Inc. did not change the result.8 ' The
court specifically stated that Congress's "common sense approach
to RICO's pattern" was "entirely consistent with our approach in
Barticheck and our prior opinion in this case." 82 The court con-
ceded that H.J. Inc. might arguably require adjustment in the
Third Circuit's prior treatment of continuity.83 The court, how-
ever, refused to accept (as appeared to have been done by Suis-
tock) that " 'continuity' is solely a 'temporal concept' and that
inquiry into the extent of the criminal activity (e.g., the number of
victims, the number of schemes, etc.) is relevant only as it bears
on the duration or threatened duration of the repeated criminal
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990) (Marshall-Silver I1).
78. Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 835 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1987) (Mar-
shall-Silver I), vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 109 S. Ct. 3233 (1989):
79. Marshall-Silver II, 894 F.2d at 595 (quoting Marshall-Silver 1, 835 F.2d at
67).
80. Id. at 594.
81. Id. at 597-98.
82. Id. at 596.
83. Id.
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conduct." 4 The court continued:
If the extent of the threatened societal injury is deemed
irrelevant and we are to focus solely on the period of
time over which the predicate acts occurred or the pe-
riod during which any threatened criminal activity would
be likely to last, "continuity" will be present in criminal
conduct that clearly does not pose a societal threat wor-
thy of the draconian penalties and remedies available
under RICO. Virtually every garden-variety fraud is ac-
complished through a series of wire or mail fraud acts
that are "related" by purpose and are spread over a pe-
riod of at least several months. Where such a fraudulent
scheme inflicts or threatens only a single injury, we con-
tinue to doubt that Congress intended to make the avail-
ability of treble damages and augmented criminal
sanctions dependent solely on whether the fraudulent
scheme is well enough conceived to enjoy prompt suc-
cess or requires pursuit for an extended period of time.
Given its "natural and common sense approach to
RICO's pattern element," we think it unlikely that Con-
gress intended RICO to apply in the absence of a more
significant societal threat. Moreover, if the Court in H.J.
Inc. intended that the duration of the predicate acts or the
threat arising therefrom should be determinative with-
out reference to whether the societal threat was limited
to a single, one time injury, we would not have expected
the Court to eschew providing a specific standard in
favor of a fact oriented, case-by-case development.8 5
The Third Circuit noted finally that it did not have to resolve
the issue of whether a single injury was sufficient to satisfy the
continuity requirement.8 6 Indeed, the court stated that its con-
clusion was in line with Swistock because in that case "(1) the pred-
icate acts occurred over a span of more than a year, (2) the
scheme lasted over two years, and (3) the defendant's wrongdo-
ing was part of a continuing business practice of such behavior
that posed a threat to others." T87 This distinction is not very con-
84. Id. (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 596-97 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 597.
87. Id.
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vincing. Tension exists between Marshall-Silver II and Swistock
which will only be resolved by future decisions.
F. Injury and Pattern
The Third Circuit has held that under section 1962(c) the
plaintiff must plead that it suffered injury from only one of the
predicate acts-it need not establish injury by the pattern of such
acts.88
G. Attorney's Fees
The Third Circuit has held that there was no rule of propor-
tionality in attorney's fees petitions under RICO cases. 89 There-
fore, the court affirmed a district court's award of attorney's fees
and costs in excess of $60,000 after the plaintiff only recovered
$2,661 in damages. 9°
IV. PROS AND CONS OF INCLUDING RICO IN YOUR COMPLAINT
As a plaintiff, even though you may be able to successfully
plead a RICO claim within Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 9 1 you must also decide whether it is prudent strategi-
cally. Therefore, it is essential to consider the practical pros and
cons of including a RICO claim in your complaint.
Usually, the biggest benefit of a RICO claim is the possibility
of treble damages and attorney's fees. There are a number of
other additional benefits, however, which must be considered as
follows:
1. Broad service of process and venue;92
2. Federal court jurisdiction, regardless of amount in
controversy; 93
3. A possible expansion of discovery by allowing the plain-
tiff to engage in discovery to prove a pattern, even though other
predicate acts did not affect this particular plaintiff;
4. Avoidance of the limited reach of other federal and state
statutes, e.g., securities law fraud requirement of "purchaser-
88. Town of Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d
1263, 1268 (3d Cir. 1987).
89. Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 471-75 (3d
Cir. 1989).
90. Id. at 477.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1988).
93. See id. § 1964(a).
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seller"; 94 and
5. Enhanced settlement leverage if the case survived a mo-
tion for summary judgment.
Along with these increased benefits, however, come some in-
creased risks. Obviously, a fraud case becomes much more com-
plex and potentially confusing to a judge and jury when you
include all the statutory requirements of RICO. In addition,
there are a number of other potential disadvantages which plain-
tiff's counsel must consider:
1. The increased cost of the motion practice, i.e., motion to
dismiss and summary judgment, which is likely to accompany a
RICO case;
2. A RICO claim alleging intentional conduct could pre-
clude coverage under directors and officers and other insurance
policies because many such policies disclaim coverage for inten-
tional conduct; and
3. Many defendants are reluctant to settle RICO claims hav-
ing been labeled a "racketeer."
It is up to each attorney to evaluate these factors in their indi-
vidual case. Within the boundaries of Rule 11, whether you in-
clude the RICO claim or not is up to you. The important point is
to read the statute and then decide whether the pros outweigh the
cons. Like the pattern requirement, the decision on whether to
bring a RICO claim or how to defend against such a claim must
be made on a case-by-case basis.
94. Note, however, that a RICO claim cannot be used to avoid an arbitra-
tion clause in a securities case. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 239 (1987).
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